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The influence of EU law on Strasbourg doctrines 
Tobias Lock* 
University of Edinburgh  
Abstract 
This article identifies four distinct areas of EU law influence on the ECtHR’s doctrines: references for 
informational purposes; references to support an autonomous interpretation; legal transplants; and 
references in the context of evolutive interpretation.  EU law is relevant for both the determination of 
the scope of Convention rights and for the ECtHR’s proportionality analysis.  But EU law influence is 
not confined to the case law of the CJEU. It includes the full spectrum of EU legal materials. While it 
welcomes the ECtHR’s engagement with developments at the European Union level the article 
expresses a normative critique that is underpinned by a concern that the ECtHR’s reasoning is often 
lacking in clarity and exposition of argument. 
Introduction 
It is a well-documented phenomenon that decision-making bodies in the field of human rights law 
draw inspiration from the law and practice of other legal orders be they domestic, regional or 
international.  The main reason for this is that even though there are multiple sources guaranteeing 
human rights these seem to be underpinned by the recognition of a common core.1  The European 
Court of Human Rights (ECtHR or Strasbourg Court) is particularly active in this regard in that many 
of its decisions feature a section on relevant ‘international law’ or ‘comparative law’.  Its approach is 
epitomised by its use of ‘European consensus’ as a way of justifying and legitimising evolutive 
interpretation or a narrow margin of appreciation based on a comparative legal analysis of 
developments in the legal orders of the parties to the Convention and of international legal 
developments in general.  The ECtHR’s comparative method has seen considerable academic 
attention, mainly with regard to its consensus approach and focused on its treatment of 
developments in municipal and international law.2  The same is true for the incorporation of most 
Convention rights into European Union law by the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) in 
developing its own set of fundamental rights as general principles.3  The ECtHR’s case law on the 
                                                          
*Lecturer in EU Law, University of Edinburgh (tobias.lock@ed.ac.uk). I would like to thank Niamh Nic Shuibhne 
and Kanstantsin Dzehtsiarou for their insightful, lucid, and helpful comments and suggestions. All errors are, of 
course, my own. 
1 Sandra Fredman, ‘Foreign fads or fashions? The role of comparativism in human rights law’ (2015) 64 
International and Comparative Law Quarterly 631, 633. 
2 E.g. relatively early on by Laurence R. Helfer, ‘Consensus, Coherence and the European Convention on 
Human Rights’ (1993) 26 Cornell International Law Journal 133; and more recently in great detail by 
Kanstantsin Dzehtsiarou, European Consensus and the Legitimacy of the European Court of Human Rights (CUP 
2015). 
3 The CJEU relied heavily on the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) – starting with Case 29/69 
Stauder v Stadt Ulm ECLI:EU:C:1969:57 – and on the case law of the ECtHR – starting with  Case C-13/94 P v S 
and Cornwall County Council ECLI:EU:C:1996:170. For academic commentary see e.g. Armin von Bogdandy, 
‘The European Union as a Human Rights Organization? Human Rights and the Core of the European Union’ 
(2000) 37 Common Market Law Review 1307; Gráinne de Búrca, ‘The Evolution of EU Human Rights Law’ in 
Paul Craig and Gráinne de Búrca (eds), The Evolution of EU Law (2nd edn, OUP 2011) 465; Jasper Krommendijk, 
‘The Use of ECtHR Case Law by the Court of Justice after Lisbon’ (2015) 22 Maastricht Journal of European and 
Comparative Law 812; Koen Lenaerts, ‘Respect for Fundamental Rights as a Constitutional Principle of the 
2 
 
responsibility of EU Member States for violations of the Convention through European Union acts 
has seen a similar amount of academic coverage.4 
The influence of European Union law on the ECHR has not, by contrast, been studied in a 
systematic manner.  The studies that exist tend to mention this aspect of EU-ECHR relations only in 
passing and to – often only briefly – discuss the reception of the CJEU’s case law into the Convention 
system.5  This article, by contrast, sets out to show how European Union law in general influences 
the doctrines developed by the ECtHR.  It moreover provides a systematisation of the ECtHR’s 
approach, which is complemented by an in-depth normative critique of its various facets.  The most 
comprehensive of these earlier studies was written by Douglas-Scott in 2006.  She remarked back 
then that ‘the Court of Human Rights does not cite Luxembourg very frequently in its own legal 
opinions’.6  This article suggests that this is changing, and not only in respect of CJEU case law but 
also as far as EU law in general is concerned.  Despite some peaks and troughs, the following graph 
indicates a pronounced upward trend in the number of references to EU law since the first two 
references occurred in 1979.7  Admittedly, these overall numbers do not account for the overall rise 
                                                          
European Union’ (2000) 6 Columbia Journal of European Law 1; Philip Alston (ed), The EU and Human Rights 
(OUP 1999); Takis Tridimas, The General Principles of EU Law (2nd edn, OUP 2006) 298 et seq.; Wolfgang Weiß, 
‘Human Rights in the EU: Rethinking the Role of the European Convention on Human Rights after Lisbon’ 
(2011) 7 European Constitutional Law Review 64.  
4 See e.g. Leonard F. M. Besselink, ‘The European Union and the European Convention on Human Rights: From 
Sovereign Immunity in Bosphorus to Full Scrutiny Under the Reform Treaty?’ in Ineke Boerefijn and Jenny E. 
Goldschmidt (eds), Changing Perceptions of Sovereignty and Human Rights, Essays in Honour of Cees 
Flinterman (Intersentia, Antwerp 2008) 295; Iris Canor, ‘Primus inter pares. Who is the ultimate guardian of 
fundamental rights in Europe?’ (2000) 25 European Law Review 3; Cathryn Costello, ‘The Bosphorus Ruling of 
the European Court of Human Rights: Fundamental Rights and Blurred Boundaries in Europe’ (2006) 6 Human 
Rights Law Review 87; Sionaidh Douglas-Scott, ‘Bosphorus v Ireland’ (2006) 43 Common Market Law Review 
243; Lech Garlicki, ‘Cooperation of courts: The role of supranational jurisdictions in Europe’ (2008) 6 
International Journal of Constitutional Law 509; Alicia Hinarejos Parga, ‘Bosphorus v Ireland and the Protection 
of Fundamental Rights in Europe’ (2006) 31 European Law Review 251; Jean-Paul Jacqué, ‘Droit 
Communautaire et Convention Européenne des droits de l’homme, l’arrêt Bosphorus, une jurisprudence 
‘Solange II’ de la Cour des droits de l´homme?’ (2005) 41 Revue Trimestrielle de Droit Européen 749; Nikolaos 
Lavranos, ‘Das So-Lange-Prinzip im Verhältnis von EGMR und EuGH’ [2006] Europarecht 79; Carl-Otto Lenz, 
‘Matthews v United Kingdom’ [1999] Europäische Zeitschrift für Wirtschaftsrecht 311; Tobias Lock, ‘Beyond 
Bosphorus: The European Court of Human Rights' Case Law on the Responsibility of Member States of 
International Organisations under the European Convention on Human Rights’ (2010) 10 Human Rights Law 
Review 529; Steve Peers, ‘Bosphorus – European Court of Human Rights’ (2006) 2 European Constitutional Law 
Review 443; Cedric Ryngaert, ‘Oscillating between Embracing and Avoiding Bosphorus: The European Court of 
Human Rights on Member State Responsibility for Acts of International Organisations and the Case of the 
European Union’ (2014) 39 European Law Review 176; Henry G. Schermers, ‘Case note on Matthews’ (1999) 36 
Common Market Law Review 673. 
5 See e.g. ; Johan Callewaert, ‘The European Convention on Human Rights and European Union Law: A Long 
Way to Harmony’ [2009] European Human Rights Law Review 768; Francis G. Jacobs, ‘Judicial Dialogue and the 
Cross-Fertilization of Legal Systems: The European Court of Justice’ (2003) 38 Texas International Law Journal 
547; Francis G. Jacobs, The Sovereignty of Law: The European Way (CUP 2007) 55-56; 59-61; Laurent Scheeck, 
‘The Relationship between the European Courts and Integration through Human Rights’ (2005) 65 Zeitschrift 
für ausländisches öffentliches Recht und Völkerrecht 837; Dean Spielmann, ‘Un autre regard: la Cour de 
Strasbourg et le droit de la Communauté européenne’ in Libertés, justice, tolerance - Mélanges en hommage 
au Doyen Gérard Cohen-Jonathan, vol II (Bruylant 2004) 1447. 
6 Sionaidh Douglas-Scott, ‘A Tale of Two Courts: Luxembourg, Strasbourg and the Growing European Human 
Rights Acquis’ (2006) 43 Common Market Law Review 629, 640. 
7 The numbers are based on a HUDOC advanced search in the category ‘International Law and Other Relevant 
Material’ for ‘European Union’, ‘European Community’; ‘European Communities’ and ‘European Court of 
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in the number of cases decided by Strasbourg.  Furthermore, they do not indicate what importance 
was accorded to EU law in each of these cases.  But even these crude numbers provide justification 
for deeper academic scrutiny of Strasbourg’s engagement with EU law. 
 
This graph shows a slight increase coinciding with the proclamation of the of the EU Charter of 
Fundamental Rights (CFR) in late 2000; and a more marked increase since its entry into force in 
2009. There are two likely reasons for this.  The first – discussed in more detail below – is that there 
is a discernible pattern in the ECtHR’s case law indicating that the ECtHR treats the CFR as an 
updated version of the Convention.  Many of the civil and political rights contained in the Charter are 
based on Convention rights, but have in some cases been slightly broadened.  For instance, 
Article 47 CFR guarantees everyone a fair and public hearing, which is largely equivalent to Article 6 
ECHR.  By contrast to that provision, however, it does not contain a restriction to proceedings 
concerning the determination of ‘civil rights and obligations’ and criminal charges.   
The second reason is that with the entry into force of the Charter the Court of Justice has 
been placed in a position in which it is confronted with more fundamental rights disputes than 
before.  This rise in the number of fundamental rights cases provides the CJEU with an incentive to 
develop its own fundamental rights doctrine independently of ECtHR precedents.  An early sign of 
this is the Google Spain case where the Court of Justice interpreted Article 7 CFR, which protects the 
right to private life and mirrors Article 8 ECHR, and Article 8 CFR, which enshrines a right to 
protection of personal data, to entail a ‘right to be forgotten’, so that the operator of an internet 
search engine is obliged to erase search results relating to data concerning individuals stemming 
from events in the past.8  It spelled out in particular that Articles 7 and 8 CFR ‘override, as a rule, not 
                                                          
Justice’ (conducted on 20 April 2016). Decisions by both the European Commission on Human Rights and by 
the ECtHR are included. Only English-language results are considered. Duplicate results were eliminated, but 
multiple hits for different decisions in the same case were retained (e.g. separate admissibility decisions; or 
appeals to the Grand Chamber). 
8 Case C-131/12 Google Spain SL and Google Inc. v Agencia Española de Protección de Datos (AEPD) and Mario 
Costeja González ECLI:EU:C:2014:317. 
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only the economic interests of the operator of the search engine but also the interest of the general 
public in finding that information.’9  In deriving the right to be forgotten from the right to private life 
and in conceiving this right in such a robust manner, the Court of Justice has put itself at the 
vanguard of data protection in Europe.  It is only a matter of time before the ECtHR will be seized of 
a dispute raising similar questions and it will be difficult for it to ignore the CJEU’s advances in this 
area of law.10  
A survey of the ECtHR’s case law conducted in preparation of this article revealed that the 
ECtHR refers to EU law and practice in three types of scenarios.  The first concerns cases in which an 
EU Member State is held responsible for violations of the Convention related to its obligations under 
EU law.11  The second scenario covers cases where the ECtHR refers to EU legal material as part of 
the factual background of the case.  For instance, in A, B and C v Ireland the ECtHR referred to 
Protocol no. 17 to the Maastricht Treaty, which provides a guarantee that the strict Irish 
constitutional prohibition on abortion remains unaffected by EU law.12  This was used by the ECtHR 
as confirmation that the restrictions on abortion in Ireland ‘were based on profound moral values’.13  
References to EU law in neither the first nor the second scenario have an influence on the 
interpretation of ECHR rights.  These types of cases will therefore not be discussed further.   
This article focuses on the third scenario, in which the ECtHR draws inspiration from EU law 
when interpreting Convention rights.  It identifies four distinct areas of EU law influence on the 
ECtHR’s doctrines.  These are references for informational purposes; references made to support an 
autonomous interpretation; legal transplants; and references in the context of evolutive 
interpretation.  EU law is relevant not only in the determination of the scope of Convention rights, 
but it is also invoked in the ECtHR’s proportionality analysis.  As far as the sources of that influence 
are concerned, it is demonstrated that they are not confined to the – indisputably important – case 
law of the CJEU, but include the full spectrum of EU legal materials – primary and secondary 
European Union law, CJEU decisions, and other legal materials.14   
                                                          
9 Ibid, para 97 (emphasis added). 
10 The CJEU’s ‘major role in redefining the limits of covert data gathering’ was e.g. expressly recognised by 
Judge Pinto de Albuquerque in Szabó and Vissy v Hungary App no 37138/14 (ECtHR, 12 January 2016). 
11 See in particular Matthews v United Kingdom ECHR 1999-I, para 32; as well as the presumption of 
Convention compliance in Bosphorus v Ireland ECHR 2005-VI, paras 155-156. 
12 A, B and C v Ireland ECHR 2010; in a similar vein in Mendizabal v France the applicant complained 
successfully that France had violated her right to private and family life according to Article 8 ECHR because 
the French authorities had refused to grant her a residence permit for a prolonged period of time even though 
she was entitled to one under EU law Mendizabal v France App no 51431/99 (ECtHR, 17 January 2006). The 
legal situation under EU law also informed the case of Piermont v France concerned a conflict around 
Article 16 ECHR, which allows states to impose restrictions on the political activity of aliens.  The applicant was 
a German national and Member of the European Parliament who had demonstrated against nuclear tests in 
French Polynesia.  She was expelled from French Polynesia and subjected to a ban on re-entry.  France relied 
on Article 16 ECHR as a justification for the interference with Article 10 ECHR.  The ECtHR however did not 
consider her to be an alien for the purpose of Article 16 as she had the nationality of an EU Member State and 
was a Member of the European Parliament, in the elections of which the people living in French Polynesia 
were entitled to take part Piermont v France (1995) Series A no 314, paras 61-64. EU law was used in the same 
way in S.A. Dangeville v France ECHR 2002-III where the ECtHR found a violation of Article 1 of Protocol 1 
because of a misapplication of the Sixth VAT Directive. 
13 A, B and C v Ireland (n 12) para 226. 
14 Hereinafter referred to collectively as ‘EU law’. 
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This classification is accompanied by an analysis asking whether the ECtHR’s approaches are 
normatively sound drawing inspiration from the literature on cross-fertilization.  References to 
developments in other legal orders, and in particular to the case law of other courts, can result in a 
number of advantages identified in this literature: The use of comparative methods strengthens the 
influence of and effectiveness of a court.15  Cross-references are further likely to improve the law by 
revealing errors or inconsistencies of past legal solutions.16  The resulting engagement of a multitude 
of courts in a common enterprise also implies mutual legitimation.17  Moreover, on a very practical 
level, looking towards other legal orders allows judges to learn and see questions in a new light.18  
Where domestic court references to international courts or supranational courts are concerned 
cross-references can lead to a higher likelihood of these approaches trickling down to the national 
level and being applied there given that an international court has the opportunity to canvass 
different national and supranational approaches so that its decisions are particularly persuasive.19  
One can thus identify two key virtues of cross-referencing and cross-fertilization: ‘better law’ 
resulting from clear and coherent common standards; and increased legitimacy of a court’s 
reasoning, which is of particular importance for international courts such as the ECtHR.  ‘Legitimacy’ 
is, admittedly, a somewhat elusive and much-debated concept.20  For the purposes of this article it 
should be understood as acceptability.  It works on the assumption that compliance with the ECtHR’s 
decisions increases with the amount of respect for its authority the addressees of its decisions and 
other stakeholders (such as national courts) have. 
This article reaches the conclusion that in light of these arguments the ECtHR’s engagement 
with developments at the European Union level should be welcomed.  At the same time, it voices a 
normative critique that is underpinned by a concern that the ECtHR’s reasoning is often lacking in 
clarity and exposition of argument, which is liable to undermining the potentially positive impact of 
cross-fertilization.  It is therefore important that the ECtHR is open about the relevance that EU law 
had in its reasoning.  The need for such openness is particularly acute where the ECtHR embarks on 
an evolutive interpretation of the Convention, as this is by some perceived to be an instance of 
problematic judicial activism.  Where the ECtHR cannot demonstrate clearly why it ended up with 
the resulting expansive reading of the scope of a Convention right, it is likely to encounter claims of 
illegitimacy.   
Deficits in the ECtHR’s methodology are most apparent and problematic where legal 
transplants are concerned.  There is evidence in the ECtHR’s case law of EU law concepts being 
transplanted into ECHR doctrine without taking into account their wider constitutional context 
                                                          
15 Thijmen Koopmans, ‘The Birth Of European Law At The CrossRoads Of Legal Traditions’ (1991) 39 American 
Journal of Comparative Law 493, 505. 
16 Anne-Marie Slaughter and Laurence R. Helfer, ‘Toward a Theory of Effective Supranational Adjudication’ 
(1997) 107 Yale Law Journal 273, 325. 
17 Ibid, 325-326. 
18 Anne-Marie Slaughter, ‘A Global Community of Courts’ (2003) 44 Harvard International Law Journal 191, 
201. 
19 Koopmans (n 15) 505. 
20 For an overview of the different strands of this debate in the context of international human rights courts 
see Başak Çali, Anne Koch and Nicola Bruch, ‘The Legitimacy of Human Rights Courts: A Grounded 
Interpretivist Analysis of the European Court of Human Rights’ (2013) 35 Human Rights Quarterly 955, 958-
961; Andreas Follesdal, ‘The Legitimacy Deficits of the Human Rights Judiciary: Elements and Implications of a 
Normative Theory’ (2013) 14 Theoretical Inquiries in Law 339, 345-346. 
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correctly.  A thorough understanding of this context is, however, necessary in order to avoid 
inappropriate or ill-informed transplants.  Otherwise, both virtues of cross-fertilization are in danger: 
‘better law’ is not achieved, and this ultimately undermines the legitimacy of the ECtHR’s decisions. 
By contrast, the article finds that the theoretically existing problems associated with the 
ECtHR’s use of consensus based on EU law in cases against non-EU Member States have not 
materialised.  The key argument against basing an evolutive interpretation of Convention rights or a 
narrow margin of appreciation on developments under EU law would be that non-EU Member States 
deliberately steered clear of these developments by not acceding to the EU.  Hence, reading EU law 
developments into the Convention might lead to them being bound through the back door.  
However, it will be shown that while these dangers are real, they have hitherto not become acute.  
Nonetheless, the tenor underlying this article rings true in these cases as well: demonstrated 
awareness of this issue and a clearer articulation of the weight accorded to EU law influences would 
lead to more convincing decisions and a more resilient body of case law. 
The ECHR and EU law: a special relationship 
It would go beyond the remit of this article to provide a complete account of the relationship 
between EU law and the law of the ECHR, let alone a fully worked-out theoretical framework.  
Nonetheless, some basic propositions are necessary in order to frame the following discussion.  All 
EU Member States are parties to the ECHR; indeed, ECHR compliance of prospective Member States 
is closely monitored during the process of accession to the EU.21  While the ECHR has been opened 
up for EU membership,22 the EU is not yet a party to the ECHR.23  Nonetheless, the ECHR formed the 
original source of inspiration for the development of the EU’s own fundamental rights by the CJEU as 
part of the general principles of EU.24  Moreover, Articles 6 (3) TEU and 52 (3) CFR are provisions 
opening up the EU legal order to ECHR influence.  By contrast, there is no such express reference to 
EU law in the ECHR.  However, this article will demonstrate in some detail that the ECtHR regularly 
refers to EU law in its reasoning so that it has opened up the ECHR legal order to EU law influence.   
This leaves the question as to the theoretical nature of the relationship between the EU and 
the ECtHR legal orders.  One encounters some difficulty in trying to locate it on the complex 
constitutionalism-pluralism spectrum, which has come to dominate the academic discussion in the 
last two decades.25  In the absence of EU accession to the ECHR, the relationship between the two 
                                                          
21 This is part of the process of assessing compliance with the EU’s values laid down in Article 2 TEU (see 
Article 49 TEU). 
22 See Article 59 (2) ECHR. 
23 The first serious attempt for EU accession to the ECHR has famously been thwarted by the Court of Justice in 
Opinion 2/13 Accession of the European Union to the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights 
and Fundamental Freedoms ECLI:EU:C:2014:2454. 
24 See n 3 for references. 
25 The constitutionalism/pluralism discussion is taking place in various dimensions. For the EU law-national law 
question see e.g. Neil MacCormick, ‘Beyond the Sovereign State’ (1993) 56 Modern Law Review 1; and Neil 
Walker, ‘The Idea of Constitutional Pluralism’ (2002) 65 Modern Law Review 317; for the relations between 
ECHR law and national law, see e.g. Nico Krisch, ‘The open architecture of European Human Rights Law’ (2008) 
71 Modern Law Review 183 ; for the EU law-international law dimension see e.g. Gráinne de Búrca, ‘The 
European Court of Justice and the International Legal Order After Kadi’ (2010) 51 Harvard International Law 
Journal 1; and for the international law discussion see e.g. William W. Burke-White, ‘International Legal 
Pluralism’ (2004) 25 Michigan Journal of International Law 963. 
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legal orders cannot be considered fully constitutionalised.  It is thus fair to describe it as pluralist.26  
However, given in particular the provisions opening up EU law to the ECHR, their relationship is not 
reflective of a pure form of pluralism, but could rather be described as an expression of a form of 
constitutional pluralism given the norms that expressly open up EU law to ECHR influence.  Indeed, 
viewed from the perspective of EU law there appears to be room for an analogy to the concept of a 
composite constitution (Verfassungsverbund) developed with regard to the relationship between 
the EU and its Member States.27  The basic argument of this theory is that the EU Treaties and the 
constitutions of the Member States are integral parts of a composite constitution, evidence for 
which is derived from provisions opening up Member State law to EU law and vice versa.28  Yet this 
theory may not be capable of explaining the reverse situation given a lack of references to EU law in 
the ECHR.  Viewed from that perspective, the relationship appears more strongly pluralistic.  
This might lead one to suggest that from the perspective of the ECHR, EU law could be 
regarded as ‘foreign (international) law’. While this may be true at one level, it would ignore the fact 
that by virtue of the doctrines of direct effect29 and primacy,30 some EU law forms part of the law of 
the EU Member States.  As will be discussed, this has implications for the ECtHR’s consensus 
doctrine in that EU law may well be considered ‘domestic’ for the purpose of determining 
consensus.  The close connection between EU law and the ECHR is particularly clear if one adopts 
the perspective of the EU Member States: they can be faced with cases of competing obligations 
under EU law and under the law of the ECHR.  Prima facie at least there is no evident solution to 
such conflicts, which explains the complex case law on the responsibility of EU Member States for 
violations of the Convention triggered by EU law.31  At the same time one needs to be conscious of 
the situation of non-EU Member States.  From their perspective, EU law is ‘foreign’ law and there 
appears to be no obvious reason why they should somehow be subjected to its influence by virtue of 
the ECHR.   
Therefore, the relationship between EU law and the ECHR is multidimensional and highly 
complex.  Suffice it to say that it is pluralist in nature with strong constitutional elements at least as 
far as its influence on EU Member States is concerned.  In that sense at least, it is a very special 
relationship.  This diagnosis may help explain some the lack of a coherent approach to EU law in the 
case law of the ECtHR. 
The practice of the ECtHR: four categories of EU law influence 
The analysis in this section is based on case law in which the ECtHR has mentioned the “European 
Union”, the “European Community”, the “European Communities” or the “Charter of Fundamental 
                                                          
26 For a strong endorsement of a pluralistic understanding see Krisch (n 25). 
27 See e.g. Leonard F. M. Besselink, A Composite European Constitution (Europa Law Publishing 2008); Armin 
von Bogdandy and Stephan Schill, ‘Overcoming Absolute Primacy: Respect for National Identity under the 
Lisbon Treaty’ (2011) 48 Common Market Law Review 1417. 
28 von Bogdandy and Schill (n 27) 1421. 
29 Starting with Case 26/62 NV Algemene Transport- en Expeditie Onderneming van Gend & Loos v Netherlands 
Inland Revenue Administration ECLI:EU:C:1963:1. 
30 Starting with Case 6/64 Costa v ENEL ECLI:EU:C:1964:66. 
31 See the cases of Matthews and Bosphorus (n 11) and the references to literature in n 4. 
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Rights” as a source of material on which it based its decision.32  The ECtHR refers to a number of 
different EU legal outputs.  They include primary and secondary EU law, such as the Treaties, the 
Charter of Fundamental Rights, Directives, and Regulations.33  Alongside these, the ECtHR cites the 
decisions of the CJEU on how these legal texts are interpreted.34  Finally, the ECtHR refers to soft law 
originating in the European Union, such as Commission recommendations35 and European 
Parliament resolutions.36   
One can identify four categories of cases in which EU material is used in the ECtHR.  EU law 
and practice are cited in the materials section of the judgment, but not in the ECtHR’s reasoning 
(first category).  EU legal material is also used to support an argument regarding the interpretation 
of the Convention.  This can happen in three distinct ways.  EU law and materials are cited to 
support an established way of reasoning, i.e. a static interpretation of the Convention (second 
category); EU law concepts are transplanted into ECHR doctrine (third category); EU law is referred 
to in the determination of European consensus and as a justification for an evolutive interpretation 
of the Convention (fourth category). 
Of course, it cannot be said with military precision how influential EU legal materials were in 
the cases discussed.  In each one of them the ECtHR cites them alongside other sources, for instance 
comparative law of the members of the Council of Europe, comparative law from non-European 
jurisdictions, international treaties, and so on.  In addition, EU law has only been referred to in a 
relatively small number of cases compared with the overall number decided by the European Court 
of Human Rights.37  Consequently, Dickson, for instance, concludes that the influence of the Charter 
of Fundamental Rights has been supportive rather than leading.38  It is contended here, however, 
that these references to EU law, and in particular the Charter of Fundamental Rights, suggest that 
these sources exert an increasing influence on the ECtHR.  This is evidenced by the fact that the case 
law of the CJEU is referred to more than that of any other court.  A search in the ECtHR’s HUDOC 
database revealed a total of 449 results compared with 137 for the International Court of Justice or 
                                                          
32 HUDOC search in “International Law and Other Relevant Material”; search terms “European Union”; 
“European Community”; “European Communities”; and “Charter of Fundamental Rights” (conducted on 20 
April 2016). 
33 E.g. reference to the principle of non-refoulement in Article 19 (2) CFR in Babar Ahmad and Others v United 
Kingdom App nos 24027/07, 11949/08, 36742/08, 66911/09 and 67354/09 (ECtHR, 10 April 2012), para 80 and 
reference to Directive 2004/23/EC on the setting of standards of quality and safety for the donation, 
procurement, testing, processing, preservation, storage and distribution of human tissues and cells in S.H. and 
Others v Austria ECHR 2011, para 44  
34 E.g. reference to Joined Cases C-387/02, C-391/02 and C-403/02 Criminal proceedings against Silvio 
Berlusconi and Others [2005] ECR I-3565 in Scoppola v Italy (no. 2) App no 10249/03 (ECtHR, 17 September 
2009), para 38. 
35 E.g. European Commission Recommendation of 30 April 2009 on remuneration policies in the financial 
services sector (2009/384/EC) in N.K.M. v Hungary App no 66529/11 (ECtHR, 14 May 2013), para 22. 
36 Resolutions on conscientious objections in Bayatyan v Armenia ECHR 2011, para 56. 
37 A HUDOC search (20 April 2016) in the section ‘international law and other relevant material’ yielded 44 
results for ‘European Union’; 28 for ‘European Communities’; and 5 for ‘European Community’ in English – 
compare this with more than 41,000 cases (judgments and decisions) available on the same database in 
English. 
38 Brice Dickson, ‘The EU Charter of Fundamental Rights in the case law of the European Court of Human 
Rights’ [2015] European Human Rights Law Review 27, 40. 
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69 for the Inter-American Court of Human Rights.39  Admittedly, these numbers are somewhat crude 
as they do not reveal how many of these cases were concerned with the responsibility of EU 
Member States for Convention violations originating in EU law or with scenarios as in A, B and C v 
Ireland.  Nonetheless, they suggest that the case law of the CJEU – and by extension EU law in 
general – is of distinct significance in the development of the ECtHR’s doctrines.  Moreover, this 
influence is likely to increase further with the CJEU becoming more and more active in the field of 
fundamental rights. It is therefore important to categorise the influence of EU law and provide a 
normative critique of its use by the ECtHR. 
Mere reference to EU law and practice 
The first category consists of cases in which the ECtHR merely mentions European Union law but 
does not refer back to it in its reasoning.  The ECtHR often includes comparative material resulting 
from comparative law reports compiled by its research division for informational purposes.40  It has 
rightly been argued that a demonstration by the ECtHR that it was aware of the possible solutions to 
a particular legal problem helps to enhance the legitimacy of a decision.41   
In some instances, EU material serves as a general informational backdrop to the case.42  In 
others European Union law is mentioned in the arguments of one of the parties or in a separate 
opinion so that reference to it in the materials section of the judgment is necessary for a proper 
understanding of these arguments.43  Sometimes EU law, in particular CJEU case law, is cited but not 
                                                          
39 A HUDOC ‘simple search’ in English (20 April 2016) for ‘European Court of Justice’ yielded 190 results; 170 
for ‘Court of Justice of the European Communities’; and 115 for ‘Court of Justice of the European Union’ (i.e. a 
total of 475).  By comparison, a ‘simple search’ for ‘International Court of Justice’ produced 140 results; there 
were 71 for ‘Inter-American Court of Human Rights’; and 140 for ‘United Nations Human Rights Committee’. 
As for domestic courts, there were 69 results in a ‘simple search’ for ‘United States Supreme Court’; 22 for 
‘Canadian Supreme Court’. As for European domestic courts, there were many more results, but mostly in 
cases brought against the home state of the respective court: 1384 for ‘Federal Constitutional Court’ (but 1294 
of these were cases against Germany, leaving 90 cases in which that court was referred to in cases not brought 
against Germany); 1201 for ‘House of Lords’ (1158 of these were cases brought against the UK, leaving 43 non-
UK cases); 11 for ‘UK Supreme Court’ (8 of these against the UK, leaving 3 non-UK cases); 49 for ‘Italian 
Constitutional Court’ (37 of these against Italy, leaving 12 non-Italian cases). 
40 Kanstantsin Dzehtsiarou and Vasily Lukashevich, ‘Informed Decision-Making: the Comparative Endeavours of 
the Strasbourg Court’ (2012) 30 Netherlands Quarterly of Human Rights 272, 273. 
41 Ibid, 274. 
42 This seems to have been the case in Nordisk Film & TV A/S v Denmark ECHR 2005-XIII; other cases include 
Pishcalnikov v Russia App no 7025/04 (ECtHR, 24 September 2009) mentioning Article 48 CFR; in Iskandarov v 
Russia App no 17185/05 (ECtHR, 22 September 2010) mentioning a letter by the EU Council Presidency to 
Russia; in van Kück v Germany ECHR 2003-VII directive 76/207 and CJEU decisions were mentioned; the 
European Parliament’s Resolution on the Confidentiality of Journalists’ Sources was mentioned in Sanoma 
Uitgevers B. V. v the Netherlands App no 38224/03 (ECtHR, 14 September 2009); the 1991 Convention 
between the Member States of the European Communities on the Enforcement of Foreign Criminal Sentences 
is mentioned in Smith v Germany App no 27801/05 (ECtHR, 1 April 2010); in Niemietz v Germany (1992) Series 
A no 251-B the ECtHR mentioned inter alia the CJEU’s decision in Joined Cases 46/87 and 227/88 Hoechst v 
Commission [1989] ECR 2859. 
43 E.g. Saadi v United Kingdom ECHR 2008 in which Art 18 CFR was mentioned in a dissenting opinion and 
Directive 2005/85/EC was referred to by a third party; in Bekos and Koutropoulos v Greece ECHR 2005-XII the 
EU’s anti-discrimination directives were only referred to by the government; in Nachova and Others v Bulgaria 
ECHR 2005-VII the EU anti-discrimination directives were referred to by a third party; in Sejdic and Finci v 
Bosnia and Herzegovina ECHR 2009 Directive 2000/43 was mentioned by the applicants; in Open Door and 
Dublin Well Woman v Ireland (1992) Series A no 246-A the CJEU decision in Case C-159/90 The Society for the 
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referred to in the ECtHR’s reasoning, but a thorough analysis of the outcome strongly suggests that 
the ECtHR’s distinct awareness of the CJEU’s position shaped the outcome of its decision.   
For example in Rantsev the ECtHR mentioned the EU’s Framework Decision on combating 
trafficking in human beings44, but did not refer back to it in its reasoning even though it dynamically 
interpreted Article 4 (1) ECHR to prohibit human trafficking.45  Given that the Framework Decision 
had been adopted unanimously by all (then) 15 Member States of the EU,46 it could have served as 
evidence of a European consensus, thus providing a powerful argument in support of the evolutive 
interpretation adopted.47 
In such scenarios it would be preferable if the ECtHR were straightforward about the 
relevance of EU material.48  Not only would such clarity strengthen its argument and make it more 
convincing, but it would also enhance the ECtHR’s function as a catalyst for dialogue: by clearly 
pointing to the strengths and weaknesses of a particular solution found in EU law, the ECtHR could 
either encourage the CJEU and the EU legislator to revise their positions on a specific human rights 
question; or it could provoke them to themselves defend their position in a more convincing 
manner.  
References made in the context of static interpretation 
This subsection reveals how the ECtHR refers to EU law in order to come up with an initial 
interpretation of the right in question or an interpretation that is concordant with its own earlier 
case law, i.e. a static – as opposed to evolutive – interpretation.  Admittedly, the distinction between 
the two categories is sometimes hard to draw as in both cases the substantive content of 
Convention rights is determined by reference to EU legal sources.  The distinguishing feature is that 
evolutive interpretation concerns situations where reference to EU law is made in order to 
demonstrate new developments in the law – typically introduced by reference to the Convention as 
a ‘living instrument’ – which justify a deviation from an earlier interpretation.  
From a normative perspective such references are generally to be welcomed as they have 
the potential to result in cross-fertilization.  The cases of Babar Ahmad and Sørensen and Rasmussen 
show how the ECtHR expressly points to developments in EU law in order to confirm its findings. In 
Babar Ahmad the ECtHR found confirmation for its traditional approach that in extradition cases 
                                                          
Protection of Unborn Children Ireland Ltd v Stephen Grogan and others [1991] ECR I-4685 was referred to by 
the applicants and in the dissenting opinion; in Vinter and Others v United Kingdom ECHR 2013 the EU 
Framework Decision on the European Arrest Warrant was referred to by the government; in Saunders v United 
Kingdom ECHR 1996-VI the CJEU’s decision in Case 374/87 Orkem v Commission [1989] ECR 3283 was 
mentioned by the applicant and in a dissenting opinion; the same case was referred to by the government in 
Funke v France (1993) Series A no 256-A. 
44 2002/629/JHA: Council Framework Decision of 19 July 2002 on combating trafficking in human beings [2002] 
OJ L 203/1. 
45 Rantsev v Cyprus and Russia ECHR 2010; the converse situation, i.e. the ECtHR not following the CJEU, can be 
found in Niemietz v Germany (n 42). 
46 See Article 34 TEU (Treaty of Amsterdam version). 
47 On consensus see below at 4. 
48 On the role of EU legal materials for the evolutive interpretation of the Convention, cf. infra; in a similar way, 
in the case of Cha’are Shalom ve Tsedek v France the ECtHR referred to an exception to the duty to slaughter 
animals with stunning contained in two EU Directives for ritual purposes only as part of the general 
background to the case, cf. Cha'are Shalom ve Tsedek v. France app no 27417/95 ECHR 2000-VII, para 20. 
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there could be no balancing of the reasons for removal of a person from a Contracting State with the 
danger of ill-treatment in the receiving state in Article 19 (2) CFR, which contains an absolute 
prohibition on so-called refoulement.49 In Sørensen and Rasmussen the ECtHR relied on EU law in 
order to consider the Danish state’s authorization of a closed-shop agreement50 to be 
disproportionate and thus incompatible with Article 11 ECHR.51  It quoted inter alia the European 
Community Charter of the Fundamental Social Rights of Workers and Article 12 CFR and concluded 
that there was ‘little support in the Contracting States for the maintenance of closed-shop 
agreements’.52  These examples show how confirmatory references to EU law serve to strengthen 
the legitimacy of the ECtHR reasoning.  Moreover, they can help the ECtHR refine its case law by 
highlighting relevant differences under EU law.53 
Most importantly, perhaps, cross-references to EU law lead to increased coherence in the 
fundamental rights protection within Europe. After all, due to overlaps in their respective 
membership, the ECHR and EU law share a legal space so that the development and maintenance of 
common standards is desirable.  This is inter alia demonstrated by the decision Sindicatul “Păstorul 
cel Bun”.54  Legislative developments at the EU level suggested that a blanket exclusion of church 
employees from the right to form a trade union did not reflect common European standards and 
could not be maintained.55  The ECtHR thereby not only confirmed the personal scope of Article 11 
ECHR to include members of the clergy, but also strengthened the EU’s Framework Directive56 by 
confirming that it correctly reflected the current state of human rights protection in Europe in that it 
expressly lays down that even though an employer’s ethos may demand a heightened degree of 
loyalty it does not prejudice the right to establish unions.57  This coherence in interpretation results 
not only in greater predictability of judgments handed down at the European level, but also greater 
clarity in guiding national courts when deciding human rights question ‘on the ground’.  This 
consideration chimes with a further dimension of cross-fertilization between EU law and the ECHR in 
that both are integral to the larger project of European integration.58   
Legal transplants 
                                                          
49 Babar Ahmad and Others v United Kingdom (n 33) para 175; reference to Article 19 (2) was made to the 
same effect in Hirsi Jamaa v Italy ECHR 2012, para. 135. 
50 The applicants in this case were compelled to join a trade union in order to keep their jobs. 
51 Sørensen and Rasmussen v Denmark ECHR 2006-I. 
52 EU law was used in a similar manner in the case of N.K.M. v Hungary (n 35) where the ECtHR took into 
account Article 34 CFR and the CJEU’s decision in Case C-499/08 Andersen v. Region Syddanmark 
ECLI:EU:C:2010:600 in finding a tax disproportionate. A similar approach was taken in Schüth v Germany ECHR 
2010. 
53 As e.g. happened in Kress v France ECHR 2001-VI. 
54 Another example is Stec and Others v United Kingdom ECHR 2006-VI. 
55 Sindicatul “Păstorul cel Bun” v. Romania ECHR 2013, para 142. 
56 Council Directive 2000/78/EC of 27 November 2000 establishing a general framework for equal treatment in 
employment and occupation [2000] OJ L303/16. 
57 A similar line of reasoning was adopted in Tătar v Romania App no 67021/01 (ECtHR, 27 January 2009) 
where the ECtHR based parts of its findings of a violation of a positive obligation under Article 8 ECHR on the 
existence of the precautionary principle in environmental law, which is inter alia laid down in the law of the EU 
(at para 120). 
58 Christopher McCrudden, ‘A Common Law of Human Rights?: Transnational Judicial Conversations on 
Constitutional Rights’ (2000) 20 Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 499, 521-522; Douglas-Scott, ‘A Tale of Two 
Courts: Luxembourg, Strasbourg and the Growing European Human Rights Acquis’, 652-653. 
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The ECtHR has gone so far as to transplant legal concepts from European Union law into the context 
of the ECHR.  Despite similarities with the consensus method discussed in the next section, legal 
transplants pose unique problems which justify a separate discussion at this point.   
 A problematic example of the use of a legal transplant can be found in Posti and Rahko v 
Finland, which concerned the question whether Article 6 (1) ECHR had to be construed in such a way 
as to allow individuals to challenge a governmental decree, which had been addressed to the public 
at large banning fishing with certain type of gear.59  Such a challenge was not possible under Finnish 
law.  The question for the ECtHR was whether notwithstanding the fact that the decree was not 
addressed to the applicants, there was a dispute over a ‘right’ in the present case.  The ECtHR 
highlighted that Article 6 (1) ECHR had to be interpreted autonomously so that the legal situation 
under Finnish law was not determinative of the question.  It pointed out that the applicants, who 
were professional fishermen, could claim a right to fish in certain State-owned waters because they 
had signed a lease with the State to that effect.  The ECtHR then added a more general consideration 
based on the CJEU’s case law on Article 263 (4) TFEU.  That provision allows individuals to directly 
challenges acts of the European Union.  If these are not addressed to them, the individual 
challenging them must show that the act is of ‘direct and individual concern’ to them.  The ECtHR 
repeated almost verbatim the CJEU’s famous Plaumann-formula, which contains the definition of 
‘individual concern’:60 
It follows that where a decree, decision or other measure, albeit not formally addressed to 
any individual natural or legal person, in substance does affect the “civil rights” or 
“obligations” of such a person or of a group of persons in a similar situation, whether by 
reason of certain attributes peculiar to them or by reason of a factual situation which 
differentiates them from all other persons, Article 6 § 1 may require that the substance of 
the decision or measure in question is capable of being challenged by that person or group 
before a “tribunal” meeting the requirements of that provision.61  
Remarkably, while on the surface using the same test as the CJEU, the ECtHR gave it a broader 
understanding.  While the CJEU requires that persons so affected must belong to a closed group of 
applicants, the ECtHR seemed to be content that the requirements of the test were met because the 
decree was ‘directly related to [the applicants’] occupation as professional fishermen.62  Under the 
Plaumann-test the mere engagement in a commercial activity would not be enough as, in theory at 
least, everyone would be able to take it up.63  Interestingly, the ECtHR quoted as confirmation for its 
interpretation not the Plaumann decision, but the CJEU’s decision in Extramet.64 
                                                          
59 Posti and Rahko v Finland ECHR 2002-VII; another problematic case in this regard is Pellegrin v France ECHR 
1999-VIII. 
60 Case 25/62 Plaumann v Commission ECLI:EU:C:1963:17, where the CJEU held: ‘Persons other than those to 
whom a decision is addressed may only claim to be individually concerned if that decision affects them by 
reason of certain attributes which are peculiar to them or by reason of circumstances in which they are 
differentiated from all other persons and by virtue of these factors distinguishes them individually just as in 
the case of the person addressed.’ 
61 Posti and Rahko v Finland (n 59) para 53. 
62 Ibid, para 52. 
63 To this effect see Plaumann v Commission (n 60) which dealt with the importation of clementines – another 
type of commercial activity. 
64 Case C-358/89 Extramet Industrie SA v Council of the European Communities ECLI:EU:C:1992:257. 
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Most of the academic discussion on legal transplants is concerned with legislative or 
constitutional transplants, and not with transplants in case law.65  Nonetheless, the criteria for legal 
transplants developed there can be useful to assess the ECtHR’s approach to them.  The ECtHR’s 
willingness to transplant concepts of European Union law into ECHR doctrine demonstrates a similar 
openness to that of the CJEU towards the ECHR when it was confronted with the task of developing 
fundamental rights as general principles.66  The arguments for such a development are broadly the 
same as those for cross-references explored in the introduction. The use of legal transplants, 
however, goes an important step further, which brings with it certain risks.  Some of the strong 
caveats voiced against the use of transplants point to cultural differences and a danger of upsetting 
the political power-balance within constitutional orders.67  These concerns are arguably less 
important where transplants between two European legal orders designed to pierce through 
national legal boundaries are concerned.  At the same time, they cannot be entirely ignored. The  
particular difficulties associated with the use of transplants were pointed out by Fedtke.68  His work 
focuses on transplants in domestic constitutional law, but his observations on fundamental rights 
transplants are nonetheless instructive.  He says that fundamental rights ‘shape the relationship 
between the state and the individual, and are often a carefully balanced expression of a society’s 
most basic values and aspirations.’69  Of course, the European Union is not a state and is not 
underpinned by a homogenous society.  Yet the EU’s Treaties are a reflection of similar 
compromises, not so much between society and the state, but between different Member States.  
Hence constitutional equilibrium is as important for the EU as it is for individual states.  This came to 
the fore in Opinion 2/13 on the EU’s accession to the ECHR, where the CJEU considered the draft 
agreement on the EU’s accession to the ECHR to be incompatible with the Treaties as it was liable to 
undermine the EU’s constitutional order.70 With this in mind, Fedtke’s warning that the borrowing of 
constitutional ideas can be an ‘unpredictable and potentially even hazardous activity’ must apply to 
borrowings from EU law as well.  This echoes the wider discussion in the field of comparative law 
that both the normative and the social context of norms must be taken into account when 
comparisons are made.  The comparator should avoid simple comparisons and subsequent 
transplants of the black letter of the law, but instead look for functional equivalence of the norms 
compared.71 
 Posti and Rahko throws the problems that an uncritical use of transplants can have into 
sharp relief.  As pointed out above the CJEU’s case law on direct access to it under Article 263 (4) 
TFEU is anything but generous.  The CJEU requires that a person, who is not an addressee of a Union 
act, be a member of a closed group of applicants, into which the applicants in the case before the 
                                                          
65 Starting (simultaneously) with Otto Kahn-Freund, ‘On Uses and Misuses of Comparative Law’ (1974) 37 
Modern Law Review 1 and Alan Watson, Legal transplants: an approach to comparative law (Scottish 
Academic Press 1974). 
66 For a discussion of these cases see e.g. Douglas-Scott, ‘A Tale of Two Courts: Luxembourg, Strasbourg and 
the Growing European Human Rights Acquis’ (n 6). 
67 See Kahn-Freund (n 65). 
68 Jörg Fedtke, ‘Constitutional Transplants: Returning to the Garden’ (2009) 61 Current Legal Problems 49. 
69 Ibid, 50. 
70 Opinion 2/13 (n 23). 
71 See e.g. John C. Reitz, ‘How to Do Comparative Law’ (1998) 46 American Journal of Comparative Law 617, 
620 et seq. 
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ECtHR, would not fall as the decree affects all current and future fishermen.72  The decision in 
Extramet relied on by the ECtHR is a noted exception to this strict case law but it is only applicable in 
anti-dumping cases.73  Hence reliance on this exception-oriented strand of case law, which is 
confined to the peculiar situation of anti-dumping measures under EU law, whilst ignoring the 
standard – much less generous – case law of the CJEU, is not appropriate.   
Nonetheless, transplants can be justified by the quality of a given ‘foreign’ solution.74 The 
case of D.H. v Czech Republic provides an example for an appropriate use of a transplant from 
European Union law to ECHR law.75  In this case the transplant was used to justify a more progressive 
approach to the burden of proof in discrimination cases under Article 14 ECHR.  The ECtHR placed 
heavy reliance on various EU directives and the CJEU’s case law on indirect discrimination.  The key 
question was whether it was sufficient proof of indirect discrimination if applicants could produce 
statistical evidence only, which had previously not been accepted by the ECtHR.76 The applicants in 
D.H. had complained against the racial discrimination of Roma children and were able to produce 
statistics which showed that in one school district Roma children were disproportionately 
represented in schools for children with special needs.  The evidence revealed that more than 50% 
of all children in such special schools were of Roma origin, whereas the proportion of Roma children 
attending primary schools in the district was only around 2% and only 1.8% of all children were 
placed in special schools.  The ECtHR relied on the case law of the CJEU, which allowed such statistics 
to establish prima facie evidence, i.e. a rebuttable presumption that discrimination had occurred.77  
The adoption of the CJEU’s approach on the evidence required to show indirect discrimination is 
convincing.  First, the CJEU can boast more expertise in matters of discrimination law.  Second, the 
legal question that the ECtHR had to determine in D.H. was identical to the legal questions with 
which the CJEU is regularly confronted: was there an indirect discrimination or not?  Hence a 
transplant was justifiable and worked well.78 
 The examples show the methodological problems with reliance on ‘snippets’ of a vast and 
sophisticated legal order when interpreting the Convention.  While transplants can be successful and 
lead to ‘better law’, as demonstrated in D.H., the key problem in the other two cases seems to have 
been that the ECtHR transplanted solutions from EU law originating in areas that have nothing to do 
                                                          
72 This case law started with Plaumann v Commission (n 60) and was recently confirmed in Case C-583/11 P 
Inuit Tapiriit Kanatami and Others ECLI:EU:C:2013:625. 
73 On this in more detail see Panos Koutrakos, EU International Relations Law (2nd edn, Hart 2015) 374-377. 
74 Fedtke (n 68) 51. 
75 D. H. and others v Czech Republic ECHR 2007-IV. 
76 Cf. the Chamber judgment in the same case: D. H. v Czech Republic app no 57325/00, 7 February 2006, 
para 46; Hugh Jordan v United Kingdom ECHR 2001, para 154. 
77 In particular, Case 170/84 Bilka Kaufhaus GmbH v Karin Weber von Hartz ECLI:EU:C:1986:204; Case C-167/97 
R v Secretary of State for Employment, ex parte Nicole Seymour-Smith and Laura Perez ECLI:EU:C:1999:60; 
Joined Cases C-4/02 and C-5/02 Schönheit and Becker ECLI:EU:C:2003:583; Case C-256/01 Debra Allonby v 
Accrington & Rossendale College, Education Lecturing Services ECLI:EU:C:2004:18; Case C-147/03 Commission v 
Austria ECLI:EU:C:2005:427. 
78 Another instance of a transplant was the case of Marckx v Belgium where the ECtHR used the approach 
taken by the CJEU in Case 43/75 Defrenne v Sabena ECLI:EU:C:1976:56, paras 69-75 to limit the temporal 
effects of an evolutive interpretation to cases not yet settled.  The ECtHR anticipated that its decision to 
declare a differential treatment of ‘legitimate’ and ‘illegitimate’ children incompatible with Article 14 in 
conjunction with Article 8 ECHR had the potential to affect settled cases predating its decision, see Marckx v 
Belgium (1979) Series A no 31, para 58. 
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with human rights.  This demonstrates a need to for careful scrutiny and thorough reasoning which 
takes account of the wider constitutional context of a provision before transplanting a solution from 
EU law into the law of the ECHR.79  Otherwise the use of legal transplants may yield the exact 
opposite of the result envisaged and undermine the legitimacy of the ECtHR’s decisions. 
Reference to EU law to determine European consensus 
Finally, the ECtHR makes reference to EU law to support findings on the existence of a European 
consensus.  The following analysis of the ECtHR’s case law is preceded by an overview of the use of 
European consensus by the ECtHR and the academic debate accompanying it.  It is then shown that 
the ECtHR relies on a number of different EU sources when determining consensus. References to 
EU law can be identified mainly in the context of evolutive interpretation, but there are also 
examples of such references in margin of appreciation cases.  The subsequent survey of the case law 
is preceded by a short introduction of the ECtHR’s consensus method and is followed by a normative 
discussion as to the prudence of using EU law in connection with European consensus. 
European consensus in the ECtHR’s reasoning 
In the ECtHR’s own words, ‘[t]he consensus emerging from specialised international instruments and 
from the practice of Contracting States may constitute a relevant consideration for the ECtHR when 
it interprets the provisions of the Convention in specific cases.’80  The ECtHR often relies on a 
presence or absence of consensus when using one of its two signature doctrinal methods: evolutive 
interpretation and the margin of appreciation. Where a European consensus is absent, it tends to 
allow a broader margin of appreciation, and where consensus is present it may embark on evolutive 
interpretation.  Despite some controversy about the the extent it should have81, an evolutive 
approach to the interpretation of the ECHR is today not disputed on a principled basis.82  Indeed, the 
effectiveness of the ECHR as a human rights instrument would be seriously compromised if it had to 
be interpreted in the same manner as it would have been understood in the 1950s; and it is hardly 
conceivable that this would have been the intention of the drafters so that a certain degree of 
flexibility embodied by evolutive interpretation can be considered to be built into the Convention. 
The flipside to evolutive interpretation is the margin of appreciation, which gives the respondent 
state some discretion when restricting a Convention right.83  It limits the ECtHR’s powers of review 
because it is an international court interpreting an international convention.84  It is based on a notion 
of subsidiarity resulting in the ECtHR showing a degree of deference to the decisions made by 
national authorities when it comes to the balancing of rights with common goals or other rights. It is 
                                                          
79 Fedtke (n 68) 91; Dzehtsiarou (n 2) 105-109. 
80 Demir and Baykara v Turkey ECHR 2008, para 84. 
81 See e.g. Lord Hoffmann, ‘The universality of human rights’ (2009) 125 Law Quarterly Review 416. 
82 Note, however, the strictly originalist view of Judge Fitzmaurice in his dissenting opinion in Marckx v Belgium 
(n 78) para 7. 
83 David Harris and others, Law of the European Convention on Human Rights (3rd edn, OUP 2014) 14; the 
margin of appreciation was first introduced in Handyside v United Kingdom (1976) Series A no 24, para 48. 
84 George Letsas, A Theory of Interpretation of the European Convention on Human Rights (OUP 2007), 90, who 
calls this the structural concept of the margin of appreciation. He also identified another, substantive, concept, 
see ibid 84 et seq. 
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thus a tool for accommodating diversity within Europe in that the ECtHR will not second-guess a 
proportionality finding by a national court if it finds a margin of appreciation to exist.85   
The key rationale behind the ECtHR’s consensus method is legitimacy.  As pointed out by de 
Londras and Dzehtsiarou, the ECtHR – as a court whose jurisdiction is subsidiary to that of domestic 
courts – needs to make an effort to maintain a functioning relationship with its key stakeholders, the 
contracting states.86  Otherwise it risks undermining the acceptance and execution of its judgments 
and an erosion of the basis for its effective functioning.  By basing its findings on consensus, the 
ECtHR shows that it justifiably goes beyond what may have been the original intention of the 
contracting states.  If the level of human rights protection in most of the parties to the Convention is 
shown to have improved, the ECtHR can therefore legitimately increase that level for the Convention 
system as a whole.   
In terms of methodology, consensus is based on socio-political and legally comparative factors 
with the latter reflecting the former.87  Of course, it should be noted that consensus is never the only 
factor in the ECtHR’s reasoning.88  The case of Ünal Tekeli v Turkey serves as a good illustration of an 
‘ideal’ consensus argument – in this case in the context of the margin of appreciation.89  Turkey was 
the only country in the Council of Europe not to allow married women to keep their birth name.  The 
ECtHR supported its argument that the unequal treatment of men and women in respect of their 
private life was not justifiable by reference to consensus.  It drew on a number of declarations by the 
Council of Europe on gender equality and pointed to developments under the auspices of the United 
Nations.  Crucially, the ECtHR noted ‘the emergence of a consensus among the Contracting States of 
the Council of Europe in favour of choosing the spouses’ family name on an equal footing’.90  In 
response to an argument by Turkey that a common surname was necessary to ensure family unity, 
the ECtHR again made reference to the practice of the other contracting states, which led it to 
conclude that ‘it is perfectly conceivable that family unity will be preserved and consolidated where 
a married couple chooses not to bear a joint family name.’   
Thus the gist of the ECtHR’s consensus reasoning is that the legitimacy of an evolutive 
interpretation of the Convention or of a narrow margin of appreciation increases if the parties to the 
Convention can be regarded to have agreed to it either by signing up to international treaties, which 
                                                          
85 Aaron A. Ostrovsky, ‘What's So Funny About Peace, Love, and Understanding? How the Margin of 
Appreciation Doctrine Preserves Core Human Rights within Cultural Diversity and Legitimises International 
Human Rights Tribunals’ (2005) 1 Hanse Law Review 47, 48. 
86 Fiona De Londras and Kanstantsin Dzehtsiarou, ‘Managing Judicial Innovation in the European Court of 
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mirror such an evolutive interpretation, or by passing legislation to the same effect.  As will be 
shown, the attributes of EU law – its multilateral nature, uniform application, direct effect, 
membership of 28 out of 47 parties to the ECHR, easy accessibility – make it a theoretically very 
potent factor in the consensus analysis.  It can in effect be regarded as part of their domestic law.  At 
the same time, its use in cases against non-EU Member States can be potentially problematic.  For 
them it is clearly foreign law.  The consensus method derives its strength from the fact that if the 
ECtHR demonstrates that other European states have progressed in a certain way, the state affected 
by a judgment based on consensus will find it easier to accept it.91  Yet if a non-EU Member State is 
in effect judged by standards developed in a legal order it either chose not to join or was not allowed 
to join, this strength could see itself transformed into a weakness. 
Survey of the case law 
A survey of the ECtHR’s case law reveals that it regularly refers to EU law sources when determining 
the existence of a European consensus. In some cases, these sources are expressly relied on in order 
to demonstrate consensus or a lack thereof, in other cases an influence to this effect can only be 
inferred from the judgment as a whole.  The following discussion distinguishes three types of cases: 
first, those in which the CFR serves as a reference point; second, those in which other sources of EU 
law are relied on; and third, cases that do not explicitly mention consensus, but where there are 
nonetheless reasons to suggest that the ECtHR’s interpretation was based on consensus and that EU 
law influenced its determination. 
References to the CFR: an updated understanding of the Convention 
Many provisions of the CFR replicate those found in the ECHR but contain slight modifications, and 
indeed modernisations.  Perhaps unsurprisingly, the cases reviewed in this study reveal a pattern in 
recent ECtHR case law of giving the Charter the role of an updated version of the Convention; and 
the Charter is explicitly used to demonstrate contemporary consensus. 
In Bayatyan v Armenia the Grand Chamber of the ECtHR decided that Article 9 ECHR entailed 
a right to conscientious objection.92  It overturned previous decisions by the European Commission 
on Human Rights which had been based on the wording of Article 4 (3) (b) ECHR, which suggests that 
conscientious objection is only protected by the Convention if recognised by the contracting party.93  
In justifying an evolutive interpretation of Article 9 ECHR, the ECtHR relied amongst other materials 
on Article 10 CFR, which is modelled on Article 9 ECHR but explicitly recognises the right to 
conscientious objection.  From this the ECtHR concluded ‘unanimous recognition of the right to 
conscientious objection in the Member States of the European Union as well as the weight attached 
that right in modern European society.’94  This phrase encapsulates the potential influence of – and 
problem with engaging – the Charter in order to determine consensus:  not only is it reflective of a 
consensus between twenty-eight European countries, but the ECtHR gives it additional weight by 
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equating those twenty-eight countries with ‘modern European society’.95  Applying a similar method 
in Neulinger v Switzerland the ECtHR Grand Chamber based its finding of a ‘broad consensus’ that 
the best interest of the child must be paramount ‘in particular’ on Article 24 (2) CFR.96   
By contrast, in Schalk and Kopf v Austria the ECtHR showed the limits of the invocation of 
the Charter.97  Despite the open wording of Article 9 CFR, the ECtHR hesitated to extend the 
corresponding Article 12 ECHR to encompass same-sex marriage.  Its argument that there was a lack 
of consensus on this question given that only six contracting parties allow it shows that updated 
Convention rights enshrined in the Charter merely contain the potential for evolutive interpretation, 
but are not in themselves sufficient.98  This is consistent with the rationale that consensus is 
concerned with actual progress in the states bound by the Convention and not with the potential for 
progress.  However, at first glance at least it sits uneasily with Christine Goodwin on the right of post-
operative transsexuals to marry a person of the sex opposite to their re-assigned gender where the 
legal situation in the UK was very much in line with that in other European countries.99  The ECtHR 
admitted that there was a ‘lack of evidence of a common European approach’ and justified an 
evolutive interpretation by relying on a ‘continuing international trend’ instead.  This could be read 
to suggest that developments in the Charter – even if not yet reflective of practice in the EU Member 
States – can be used to justify consensus where there is additionally an emerging international 
consensus.  Of course, this makes the ECHR’s approach in Schalk and Kopf difficult to explain as, 
arguably, a similar international trend is discernible with regard to same-sex marriage.100  This 
suggests that the case law in this regard is somewhat mixed up and clarification would certainly be 
welcome. 
References to other EU sources 
While the Charter is the most obvious point of reference for aiding with the interpretation of the 
ECHR, other sources of European Union law can equally help to reveal the existence or non-
existence of consensus.  In Micallef v Malta the ECtHR made reference to a CJEU judgment101 to 
support an evolutive interpretation to extend fair trial rights to interim proceedings.  By contrast, in 
S.H. v Austria the ECtHR relied on an explicit provision in Directive 2004/23/EC on the setting of 
standards of quality and safety for the donation, procurement, testing, processing, preservation, 
storage and distribution of human tissues and cells to show that there was no consensus at the 
material time.  That provision expressly states that the Directive does not interfere with the 
decisions of Member States on the use of human cells, so that the ECtHR did not find that the 
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respondent state overstepped the limits of the margin of appreciation resulting from the lack of 
consensus.102 
Cases not explicitly mentioning consensus 
There are additionally cases in which the ECtHR justified an evolutive interpretation of the 
Convention with reference to developments under EU law without expressly mentioning consensus, 
even though its reasoning is evidently based on it.  In Sergey Zolotukhin v Russia the Grand Chamber 
of the ECtHR followed the approach taken in EU law to the determination of what constitutes the 
‘same offence’ offence for the purpose of the non bis in idem principle laid down in Article 4 
Protocol 7 ECHR.103  Quoting Article 50 CFR, which adopts the same ambiguous wording as Article 4 
Protocol 7 ECHR, and Article 54 of the Convention Implementing the Schengen Agreement, which 
speaks of ‘same facts’, the  ECtHR referred to a number of CJEU decisions, all of which were in favour 
of looking at the identity of the facts rather than the legal classification of the offence.104  The ECtHR 
therefore consolidated its hitherto inconsistent case law on the question by adopting the ‘same 
facts’ approach. While it did not expressly mention consensus its reasoning appears to have been 
based on consensus-type considerations.105  In a similar vein, in Konstantin Markin v Russia the 
ECtHR decided that the denial of parental leave to a fathers working in the military, while entitling 
mothers in the same line of employment, constituted discrimination and was in breach of Article 14 
in conjunction with Article 8 ECHR.  The ECtHR relied inter alia on EU legislation and CJEU case law  
on the matter106 to show that society had evolved since its judgment in Petrovic v Austria, where it 
had found a similar provision of Austrian law to not be discriminatory since there existed no 
European consensus on the matter at the material time.107  Like in Markin, the ECtHR itself did not 
explicitly refer to European consensus, even though the fact that it overturned Petrovic and the (on 
this point) concurring opinion by Judge Pinto de Albuquerque, who expressly mentions consensus, 
suggest that this was a consensus case.108  Both cases are furthermore instances of the ECtHR basing 
an evolutive interpretation in cases brought against non-EU Member States on developments under 
EU law.  This will be problematized in the following section. 
EU law and European consensus: some normative questions 
The previous discussion has shown that the ECtHR is minded to make reference to EU law sources 
when determining the existence of a European consensus.  As argued above, the resulting cross-
fertilization is generally to be welcomed as a positive development.  However, consensus analysis 
goes a step further and poses its own challenges.  As will be shown in particular, the ECtHR bases its 
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findings on EU law not only in cases brought against EU Member States, but also in cases against 
non-EU Member States.  Here the difficulties in categorizing EU law mentioned above come to the 
fore. 
There are generally good reasons for references to EU law in order to support a finding of 
European consensus.  First, comparative analysis forming the basis of the determination of 
consensus is highly complex and the ECtHR’s research unit has limited resources.109  In this respect 
references to European Union law have the great advantage of automatically reflecting an 
agreement between twenty-eight out of forty-seven states bound by the Convention.  On a practical 
level, EU law is moreover readily accessible in the two working languages of the ECtHR, French and 
English.  Second, EU law is of a unique quality which makes it more akin to domestic law than 
international law.  It not only takes primacy over conflicting provisions of national law,110 but is also 
capable of having direct effect, i.e. being directly relied upon in the courts of the Member States.111  
Its harmonising quality and decentralised application thus make it a highly persuasive and ideal basis 
of consensus.112  As such it would be appropriate to consider it part of the domestic consensus 
rather than international consensus, which implies a high persuasive value.113  Third, the ECHR and 
the European Union are founded on shared values.  Both systems have the ‘European idea’ as a 
common heritage, most visible in their use of the European flag as a symbol.114  Fourth, there may 
be good substantive reasons why a particular solution found in EU law is convincing.  This may be 
particularly so where EU law can claim special expertise, e.g. in anti-discrimination law.  In sum, 
taking inspiration from EU law could result in European consensus par excellence.   
The following paragraphs subject this argument to some scrutiny, however.  While it is 
acceptable for EU law sources to form an important aspect of the consensus analysis, some caution 
is warranted in particular in cases with non-Member States as respondents.  Nonetheless, it 
transpires from the analysis of the ECtHR’s practice that it has largely managed to avoid the 
theoretically existent pitfalls. 
 As far as cases brought against EU Member States are concerned there is at first glance little 
that would speak against references to EU law developments for the determination of consensus.  It 
is a rule of international treaty interpretation reflected in Article 31 (3) (c) VCLT that an interpreter 
must take into account ‘[a]ny relevant rules of international law applicable in the relations between 
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the parties.’  In the case of the EU Member States this obviously includes EU law.  Closely related to 
this is the argument that the ECtHR would be faced with a situation in which the Member State 
concerned had expressed its consent to a certain solution under one regime (the EU) so that it is 
justifiable to hold it to a similar standard under the ECHR.  Indeed, a Member State could be accused 
of inconsistent behaviour (venire contra factum proprium) if it does not live up to the commitments 
made under EU law in a case brought against it pending before the ECtHR. 
There is one consideration, however, which suggests that even in cases brought against EU 
Member States the ECtHR should not only rely on the consensus within the EU.  This would in 
particular be the case where consensus was used to justify an evolutive interpretation or a narrow 
margin of appreciation.115  The reason is that the ECtHR follows a de facto doctrine of precedent. 
While it does not consider itself formally bound by a doctrine of stare decisis akin to that under the 
common law it will normally refer to its earlier judgments in the ‘interests of legal certainty, 
foreseeability and equality before the law’.116  It thus bases later decisions on earlier ones unless 
there are good reasons not to do so.117  The de facto resulting erga omnes effect of the ECtHR’s 
judgments is likely to lead to spill-over effects into cases not concerning EU Member States even 
where an evolutive interpretation of the Convention was mainly based on a consensus between EU 
Member States.  
 A connected point needs to be made as far as the ECtHR’s tendency to treat the EU Charter 
of Fundamental Rights as an updated version of the ECHR is concerned.  As Article 51 (1) CFR 
demonstrates, the Charter is always binding on the Union and its institutions, but only binding on 
the Member States ‘when they are implementing Union law’. This restricted applicability to the 
Member States stems from the fact that most of the time European Union law is applied through 
them.  The Union’s model of executive federalism thus necessitates that where the Member States 
are acting as ‘agents’ of the Union, they must abide by the Charter.  Consequently, where Member 
States are not implementing Union law, they are not bound by the Charter.118  The Member States 
were adamant to make this clear by expressly stating that the Charter does not extend the 
competences of the EU in both Article 6 (1) TEU and Article 51 (2) CFR.  This shows that they did not 
consent to being bound by the Charter in all situations.  It cannot therefore be considered a 
harmonised standard of fundamental rights for all Member States in all situations.  Moreover, given 
that the Union itself is not (yet) a party to the ECHR, some additional caution as to the Charter’s 
evidentiary value for the proof of European consensus is required.  It should therefore not be 
uncritically read into the Convention as being straightforwardly an updated version of the original.   
 Similar considerations warrant caution in this regard as far as cases brought against non-EU 
Member States are concerned.  While it is true, as the ECtHR has itself pointed out, that ‘it is not 
necessary for the respondent State to have ratified the entire collection of instruments that are 
applicable in respect of the precise subject matter of the case concerned’119, it would be wrong if in 
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such cases the ECtHR relied purely on a numbers game when determining consensus.  This would 
result in the non-EU members being co-opted into developments brought about by a group of 
contracting states without the possibility of those states which perhaps deliberately stayed out of 
the EU having had the chance to influence such developments.  There is already a tendency that the 
ECtHR adopts a formal approach purely based on numbers.120  This tendency is perhaps best 
encapsulated in the following quote by former ECtHR Judge Rozakis:  
It is undeniable that evidence of the existence of a European consensus in situations where 
and advanced protection is offered by the EU legal order is easily detectable. […] The 
evidence that the EU Member States consent to an advanced protection suffices, I think, to 
prove the existence of European consensus […].121 
It is suggested that a formal approach such as this would be problematic.  First, the ECtHR needs to 
ensure that its approach regarding the determination of consensus does not violate the rule laid 
down in Article 34 VCLT that a treaty does not create obligations for third parties without their 
consent.  Thus consensus needs to be based on more than pure numbers.  With regard to EU law it 
should additionally be pointed out that legislation can usually be adopted with a qualified majority 
of Member States voting in its favour so that sole reliance on numbers may not even reflect the true 
consensus amongst EU Member States.   
Second, the driving force behind the consensus approach appears to be with the legitimacy 
of the ECtHR’s decisions, the rationale being that the respondent would find a decision easier to 
accept if it can be shown that there is a consensus amongst the other parties to the ECHR.  One can 
voice some doubt as to whether a decision would be as easily acceptable where a non-EU state was 
the respondent and an interpretation was mainly based on developments in EU Member States. This 
chimes with Murray’s criticism that consensus analysis could lead to a ‘hegemony of the majority’.122  
The legitimising potential of consensus consists in its conception as an implicit consent of the parties 
to the ECHR, which in the case of non-EU Member States may be considered lacking as far as the 
Charter is concerned.123  It is thus important that in such cases the ECtHR is aware of the problems 
that references to EU materials can create.  It should ensure that it either bases its reasoning not 
purely on consensus or treats a consensus determined on the basis of developments in EU Member 
States as having less force than it ordinarily would.  Otherwise it risks undermining the ECHR system 
by effecting the exact opposite of what consensus sets out to achieve, namely increasing the 
acceptability of its decisions.  Moreover, the ECtHR should remain open to not following a consensus 
if there are good reasons for not doing so.124  In connection with the previous discussion, one of 
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these good reasons – though not actually employed by the ECtHR so far – could be that in a case 
brought against a non-EU Member State a consensus is mainly based on developments in EU law.  
 With this in mind, it is now appropriate to revisit the above-discussed cases brought against 
non-EU Member States, in which the ECtHR relied on EU legal materials in the context of a 
consensus analysis.  The problem lies in the special status of EU law for the ECHR legal order.  As 
pointed out above, on the one hand it shares many features of domestic law, but on the other hand, 
for non-Member States it is clearly ‘foreign’.  An express recognition of this ambiguity on part of the 
ECtHR could perhaps be coupled with an admission that a ‘one type of consensus fits all approach’ 
may not be appropriate and result in a greater degree of clarity and acceptability on part of non-
Member States.  While there are some deficits in the ECtHR’s reasoning in some of these cases, the 
following brief analysis reveals that overall the ECtHR’s use of EU materials in cases brought against 
non-Member States is sound – as it has not placed sole reliance on developments at the EU level – 
and that therefore the theoretically existent dangers have not materialised to a large degree.  
Nonetheless, it would the ECtHR could improve its reasoning by clarifying the relative weight 
accorded to each of the sources cited.  
In all cases brought against non-EU Member States referred to above the ECtHR did not 
solely rely on developments under EU law in order to show consensus.  For instance in Demir and 
Baykara v Turkey, the Charter was one of many sources cited alongside inter alia the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), an ILO Convention and Council of Europe 
instruments.125  In Sergey Zolotukhin v Russia the ECtHR’s approach was a little more problematic as 
the only instrument relied upon to which Russia had ratified was the ICCPR.  All other instruments, 
such as the Statute of the International Criminal Court, or the case law of the Inter-American Court 
of Human Rights and of the United States Supreme Court, as well as the EU legal materials referred 
to had not been signed up to by Russia.  While this does not mean that the consensus analysis is 
illegitimate here, it would have been positive if the ECtHR had provided more detail as to why this 
solution was considered convincing enough to justify an evolutive interpretation that is binding on 
Russia.  There is in particular a lack of analysis of the domestic law of non-EU Member States that 
are parties to the ECHR.  The approach taken in Bayatyan v Armenia is more appropriate in this 
regard.  The ECtHR was in a position to point not only to the CFR, but also to the fact that only four 
other contracting parties did not respect the right to conscientious objection.  Thus European Union 
law was only one piece of evidence in this regard.126  The overall consensus was strong and not only 
present among the EU’s Member States but also in non-EU countries.  In Neulinger v Switzerland the 
ECtHR appeared to place a special emphasis on the Charter as it was the only instrument referred to 
and highlighted (‘in particular’) in the actual reasoning even though numerous other treaties which 
Switzerland was bound by appeared in the ‘relevant domestic law and international law and 
practice’ section of the judgment.  Hence while the dangers exist in theory – and the ECtHR should 
be aware of them – in practice they have not materialised. 
Conclusion: call for an open and consistent approach 
The discussion in this article has shown that the ECtHR makes regular use of European Union legal 
materials in its judgments.  While the tenor of the argument is generally supportive of references of 
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this kind as they are likely to result in ‘better law’ and increased legitimacy of the ECtHR’s decisions, 
the article expresses some unease as to the exact way in which the ECtHR uses European Union law 
in its judgments.  The various criticisms revealed in the above discussion can be condensed as 
follows.  First, the ECtHR should be open about the relevance of EU law referred to in any given case.  
It must be clear why the ECtHR makes reference to it and in how far recourse to EU law has 
influenced its judgment.  Clarity strengthens the argument and is therefore conducive to achieving 
the two aims of ‘better law’ and legitimacy.  Second, when adopting approaches first developed in 
European Union law, the ECtHR should ensure that it takes account of the wider constitutional 
context surrounding the respective piece of European Union law.  This is not only important when 
considering legal transplants, but also where the ECtHR relies on EU law to demonstrate the 
existence of a European consensus.  Third, the ECtHR should become clear about the classification of 
European Union law as supranational law sui generis.  It would be useful to acknowledge that it is 
neither domestic nor international law, but possesses unique qualities.  Clarity of classification will 
become particularly relevant in case the European Union finally signs up to the Convention.127  Such 
a move could result in further question marks regarding references to EU law for the purpose of the 
ECtHR’s consensus analysis. This is because European Union law could no longer be treated as a 
source of international law to which the majority of the ECHR’s contracting parties have signed up, 
but it would at the same time be the ‘domestic law’ of one of those contracting parties.  In this 
scenario, the double-faced nature of European Union law is likely to become even more visible and it 
will be necessary to acknowledge it as such. 
The ECtHR is thus called upon to adopt a more consistent and open approach. In particular, it 
should avoid argumentative shortcuts by uncritically copying EU law approaches without properly 
scrutinising their ‘fit’.  By contrast, a more thorough legal analysis and the resulting more convincing 
legal argument would lead to ‘better law’.  Moreover, as de Londras has pointed out, the ECtHR 
forms an important part of European constitutionalisation.128  Its decisions influence the 
development of fundamental rights conceptions at the national, supranational, and international 
level.  Its influence varies, of course, but its position has been described as a ‘shadow constitution’ 
for some domestic legal orders.129  If the ECtHR wishes to continue fulfilling this role – and there are 
good reasons that it should130 – then it must ensure that its decisions are perceived as legitimate.  
Thorough reasoning and a consistent and open approach as to the origin of a particular approach 
taken are tools to enhance the legitimacy of judgments.  Enhanced legitimacy and ‘better law’ would 
also provide an encouragement for the CJEU and for national courts to base their decisions on the 
ECtHR.  This way the ECtHR would make the most of its constitutionalist role in the European legal 
space and continue to contribute to the development of the rule of law beyond. 
 
                                                          
127 The achievement of this goal has recently been made more complicated by the Court of Justice, see Opinion 
2/13 (n 23). 
128 Fiona De Londras, ‘Dual functionality and the persistent frailty of the European Court of Human Rights’ 
[2013] European Human Rights Law Review 38, 40. 
129 Alec Stone Sweet, ‘Sur la constitutionalisation de la Convention européenne des droits de l'homme: 
cinquante ans après son installation, la Cour européenne des droits de l'homme conçue comme une cour 
constitutionelle’ (2009) 80 Revue Trimestrielle des Droits de l'Homme 923, 935. 
130 See e.g. De Londras (n 128). 
